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GINZBURG IN HARLEM: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIMITIVISM 
 
Abstract 
The historian Carlo Ginzburg is renowned for his critique of modern, scientific reason and his 
articulation of an alternative form of knowledge which he labels ‘conjectural’. This form of knowledge, 
supposedly more attuned to the historian’s interest in the singular and specific fragment, as opposed to 
the abstract and universal concept, is so rooted in the practices of the prehistoric hunter that Ginzburg 
sometimes describes it as a ‘venatic’ form of deduction, binding ‘the human animal closely to other 
animal species’. In this essay, I explore the ramifications of this alternative form of knowledge, 
attending especially to its relationship to the modernist theme of ‘primitivism’. I do so by juxtaposing 
Ginzburg’s critical appraisal of Arthur Conan Doyle’s most famous literary invention, Sherlock 
Holmes, and Rudolph Fisher’s own literary invention, John Archer, the physician who sometimes aids 
criminal investigations in African-American Harlem. I argue that the differences between Archer and 
Holmes draw attention to some troubling implications of Ginzburg’s historiographical argument. 
Folding this analysis on itself, however, I also suggest that what might be at stake, when Ginzburg 
insists so troublingly on the importance of the singular, venatic trace, is the evocation of Walter 
Benjamin’s understanding of the historical ‘event’. 
 
Word count: 6793 
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Introduction 
The historian Carlo Ginzburg (1990) is greatly renowned for his critique of modern, scientific reason 
and his articulation of an alternative form of knowledge which he labels ‘conjectural’. This alternative 
form of knowledge, Ginzburg argues, is rooted in the practices of the prehistoric hunter, tracking its 
elusive prey: 
Man has been a hunter for thousands of years. In the course of countless chases he learned to reconstruct the 
shapes and movements of his invisible prey from tracks on the ground, broken branches, excrement, tufts of 
hair, entangled feathers, stagnating odors. He learned to sniff out, record, interpret, and classify such 
infinitesimal traces as trails of spittle. He learned how to execute complex mental operations with lightning 
speed, in the depth of a forest or in a prairie with its hidden dangers (102). 
Consequently, Ginzburg sometimes also describes conjectural knowledge as a ‘venatic’ (103) form of 
deduction, which ‘binds the human animal closely to other animal species’ (125). According to 
Ginzburg (1999), the fundamental importance of what then is effectively an immemorial form of 
knowledge is that it enables historians to argue against contemporary post-structuralist and 
deconstructive critiques of language and reference that ‘knowledge (even historical knowledge) is 
possible’ (25). In this essay, I propose to explore the ramifications of this so powerful, alternative form 
of knowledge, attending especially to its relationship to the modernist theme of ‘primitivism’, that is, to 
the modernist attempt to question dominant cultural values by recourse to that which is so temporally 
distant and different as to be outside historical time (see also Hiller 1991). Furthermore, while 
Ginzburg has insisted steadfastly and importantly on the fundamentally different ambitions of 
historical and literary representation, critically at issue in Ginzburg’s own, formative reading of Leo 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace, he also argues that the literary imagination none the less provides powerful 
insight into the structure of conjectural knowledge (see Ginzburg 1993). I will therefore advance the 
proposed exploration by juxtaposing, on the one hand, Ginzburg’s critical appraisal of Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s most famous literary invention, Sherlock Holmes, and, on the other hand, Rudolph Fisher’s 
own literary invention, John Archer, the African-American physician who sometimes aids criminal 
investigations in African-American Harlem. Such choice is not motivated by Conan Doyle’s and 
Fisher’s shared, literary conjunction of medical science and the investigation of criminal misdeeeds 
alone. Fisher’s texts also are germane because they are important examples of the African-American 
literary modernism associated with the phrase ‘Harlem Renaissance’ (see Baker 1987). Like others 
associated with the movement, these very perceptive texts embrace the critique of modern culture and 
its pretensions, but also betray unease and ambivalence toward the celebrations of African traditions 
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that characterised the contemporaneous cultural interventions of leading African-American 
intellectuals such as W.E.B. Du Bois, who sought to establish thereby an autonomous African-
American culture. I will argue that the consequent differences between Archer and Holmes draw 
attention to the problematic political implications of Ginzburg’s otherwise seductive evocation of a 
form knowledge that ‘binds the human animal closely to other animal species’, namely its complicity 
with imperialism, colonialism and, ultimately, racism (see also Young 1990). Prompted, however, by 
an interestingly partial quotation of Walter Benjamin in one of Ginzburg’s most famous texts, The 
Cheese and the Worms (1976), an aporia which perhaps is the trace of something more than meets the 
reader’s eye, I will also suggest that what might in fact be at stake, when Ginzburg insists so 
problematically on the importance of the singular, venatic trace, is the evocation of Benjamin’s 
understanding of the historical ‘event’, whereby Benjamin could only conclude that a philosophy of 
history which ‘does not take into account the power to prophesy from coffee grains cannot be true 
philosophy’ (as quoted in Scholem 1975: 77; author’s translation and emphasis).1 
 
Ginzburg and the art of detection 
There is much at stake in weighing very seriously Carlo Ginzburg reflections on historiographical 
practice, despite the devastating philosophical critiques to which they have been subjected (see, for 
example, La Capra, 1985). Over the past twenty and more years, Ginzburg’s rejection of modern, 
totalising historical narratives and his articulation of an alternative, conjectural form of knowledge 
have proved critically important not only to the revival of social historians’ political ambitions to speak 
for the vanquished and forgotten, such as the famous Menocchio in Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the 
Worms, but also to the reassertion of historians’ distinctive mode of inquiry, one that values that 
which is singular and specific over the general and universal (see Magnússon 2003). Ginzburg’s 
argument has also served to further the rejection of totalising narratives within the very social sciences 
which shaped the emergence of modern, totalising historical narratives, in favour of ethnographic 
observation (see Pottage 2001). In either case, however, the appropriation has not always been in 
terms to which Ginzburg himself would subscribe, insofar as, when Ginzburg speaks of the possibility 
of ‘historical knowledge’, he refers to the very same experience that modern, totalising historical 
narratives would seek to recover. As he puts it in the closing lines to his introduction to The Cheese 
and the Worms, lines that speak directly and uncompromisingly to the historian’s political obligations: 
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To respect [the past’s] residue of unintelligibility that resists any attempt at analysis does not mean succumbing 
to a foolish fascination for the exotic and incomprehensible. It is simply taking note of a historical mutilation of 
which, in a certain sense, we ourselves are the victims. ‘Nothing that has taken place should be lost to history’, 
wrote Walter Benjamin. ‘But only to redeemed humanity does the past belong in its entirety’. Redeemed and 
thus liberated (Ginzburg 1980: xxvi).. 
The question for the historian who would not succumb ‘to a foolish fascination for the exotic and 
incomprehensible’ would then seem to be about what historiographical method might be most 
attentive to that which is singular and specific, and yet offer insight into ‘the past in its entirety’. In one 
of the earliest interventions in which he seeks to articulate a formal answer to this difficult question, 
Ginzburg (1990) turns his attention to the fictional works of Arthur Conan Doyle, as well as the 
contemporaneous, more technical works of Sigmund Freud and the art connoisseur Giovanni Morelli. 
 
As is well known, when compared with Sherlock Holmes’ extraordinary capacity to establish both the 
identity of the culprit and their criminal motives from the most minute irregularity, the inimitable, 
retired physician John Watson is supposed to personify the limits of scientific reason, insofar as 
Watson focuses on that which is regular and patterned, notwithstanding that the crimes to which he 
and Holmes attend are anything but regular and patterned. Although Ginzburg is greatly captivated by 
the contrast between these two characters, it should be noted how he overlooks Watson’s pivotal role 
as retrospective narrator such that, without Watson, there could have been be no Holmesian forensic 
exploits. Ginzburg thus overlooks both the possibility that the two forms of knowledge which he 
contrasts may in fact be intimately related and the pivotal role of language in the constitution of 
reality, the latter being something that did not wholly escape the attention of Conan Doyle (2006: 1) 
himself, when he prefaced the opening of A Study in Scarlet (1888), in which Holmes makes his first 
public appearance, with the mock-realist words ‘being a reprint from the reminiscences of John H. 
Watson, M.D., late of the Army Medical Department’. Nevertheless, Ginzburg goes on to trace the 
history of an increasing formalisation of the effectively immemorial form of knowing which Holmes is 
supposed to personify, contrasting it with a historically specific form that emphasises abstraction and 
generalisation as the keys to revealing all that is hidden from human sight. If Galileo Galilei personifies 
the latter mode of inquiry, Giulio Mancini, Galileo’s contemporary, as well as physician, naturalist and 
prototypical art connoisseur, articulates the former mode, drawing on an understanding of medical 
practice as ultimately grounded in semiosis, the reading of signs, rather than mathesis, calculation 
from first principles. While this understanding might be said to clarify the historical links between 
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medicine and the divinatory practices of the ancient priestly castes, for Ginzburg, what is more 
important is that irregularity, the descendant of that which is anomalous and portentous, is profoundly 
significant because, although it captures the actor’s attention, it does so outside the controlling and 
disciplining functions of consciousness and reason. As such, that which is deemed irregular becomes 
the trace of the actor’s sensual encounter with the world. As Ginzburg  puts it, the ‘infinitesimal traces’, 
which, he argues, eventually became Morelli’s, Freud’s and Conan Doyle’s distinctive concern, ‘permit 
the comprehension of a deeper, otherwise unattainable reality’ (101). It is worth noting at this point 
that, if the histories of medical practice and conjectural knowledge are so intimately intertwined, 
Ginzburg’s understanding of medicine as a fundamentally semiotic practice then is much closer to that 
advanced by Georges Canguilhem, in The Normal and the Pathological (1966), than it is to that 
advanced by the latter’s most famous disciple, Michel Foucault, in The Birth of the Clinic (1963). This 
is particularly significant insofar as Foucault, the historian who strove to challenge the very same 
Hegelian and Marxist totalising histories which Ginzburg seeks to overturn, sought to question his 
mentor’s normative, ideological critique of modern medicine by radically historicising the epistemic 
practices of both medical semiotics and scientific medicine (Gutting 1989: 52-54). In other words, 
according to Foucault, semiosis and mathesis are indeed as fundamentally different epistemic 
practices as Canguilhem maintained, but they also are equally historically specific forms of knowledge, 
the one being no more ‘truthful’ than the other. Nevertheless, Ginzburg goes on to argue that the 
conjectural, semiotic mode of inquiry is what distinguishes the humanities and their capacity to 
account for the realities of the human condition from the abstracting social and natural sciences, 
noting incidentally that the mode of inquiry on which the humanities are predicated is infinitely more 
democratic because it values the ‘patrimony … of men and women from all social classes’ (115). 
Ginzburg also argues that ‘linguistics’ is the one humanistic enterprise that has succumbed to the 
illusory and elitist attractions of ‘the powerful and terrible weapon of abstraction’ (115). He thus 
dismisses both structuralist theories of language and human action, as well as all those who have 
worked in the shadow of structuralism, including Foucault, who, in The Order of Things (1966), 
maintained that the opposition between the singular and the universal, to which Ginzburg pays so 
much attention and equates all too problematically with the difference between semiosis and mathesis, 
is the product of a distinctly modern discursive enframing of that which is heterogeneous and 
multiple.2 The adventures of Rudolph Fisher’s fictional detective, John Archer, offer a vehicle for a 
more sustained, historically specific, as opposed to philosophical, exploration of the questions that 
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Ginzburg’s argument thus poses. In other words, Archer’s adventures offer a vehicle to challenge 
Ginzburg on his own terrain. 
 
Rudolph Fisher in Harlem 
While Rudolph Fisher is largely forgotten today, despite the recent re-release of popular editions of his 
work and occasional critical appraisals (see Soitos 1996; Gosselin 1999; and Condé 2002), in his own 
day he was an important figure in the literary development that goes by the name of the ‘Harlem 
Renaissance’, so much so that more memorable figures such as Langston Hughes recalled that ‘the 
wittiest of these New Negros of Harlem, whose tongue was flavoured with the sharpest and wittiest 
humor, was Rudolph Fisher … who always frightened me a little, because he could think of the most 
incisively clever things to say – and I could never think of anything to answer’ (as quoted in McCluskey 
1987: xvii). The more immediately relevant biographical observation, however, is that Fisher, like 
Arthur Conan Doyle, had trained to become a biomedical researcher, but, after failing to secure a 
permanent position in the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University, as researcher in 
radiation biology, he settled in nearby Harlem as a general physician, radiologist and aspiring writer. 
Fisher’s career as a writer was brief, however, as he died very young, before he was ever able to achieve 
the public recognition which many of his contemporaries thought he deserved. This said, there is 
something interestingly different about Fisher’s fictional physician and detective John Archer, who 
figures in both the novel The Conjure Man Dies (1932) and the posthumously published short story 
Dr. Archer’s Nose (1935). It may even explain why Hughes found Fisher as troublesome as his 
recollections of him would seem to suggest. 
 
The plot of The Conjure Man Dies revolves around the murder of N’Gana Frimbo. Frimbo is an 
unusual Harlemite insofar as he is the King of Buwongo who left his native country for the United 
States, to study biology, psychology and philosophy at Harvard University, and eventually settled in 
Harlem as a conjureman, continuing in his spare time to conduct physiological experiments in altering 
the human germplasm. Leading the official investigation is Perry Dart, the first of a handful of African-
Americans on the Harlem police force to have gained promotion from patrolman to detective. Working 
with Dart is the abovementioned Archer, who, besides being the retrospective narrator of the 
unfolding investigation, also reflects on the nature of human knowledge, sometimes drawing attention 
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to the fundamental similarities between the work of a physician and a detective; as Archer puts it to 
Dart: 
I am a detective … all my training and all my activities are those of a detective. The criminal I chase is as prime a 
rascal as you’ll ever find. Diseases are assailants, thieves, murderers. In each case I get, it’s my job to track 
disease down, identify it, and arrest it. What else is diagnosis and treatment? (124). 
Of equal importance is Bubber Brown, a sanitation worker turned private investigator, who works to 
clear his unemployed partner, Jinx Jenkins, of the charge that he murdered Frimbo. Halfway into 
these three characters’ strikingly collective investigation, which, by itself, begins to challenge the 
formal rules of the genre then epitomised by Conan Doyle’s novels, by calling into question the site of 
forensic reason, the corpse disappears and, shortly thereafter, Frimbo reappears, seated in the very 
chair where his corpse had been first found. Frimbo is unable to convince Dart and Archer that what 
they took for his death was a state of suspended animation, and, when it is discovered that the dead 
body found on the scene of the crime was not that of the conjureman, but that of N’Ogo Frimbo, the 
conjureman’s assistant and countryman, the conjureman is suspected of murdering his assistant, 
perhaps to obtain the human gonads he needs for his physiological experiments. In the meantime, 
Frimbo himself seeks to use his psychic abilities, which he attributes to the power of deduction in a 
thoroughly deterministic universe, to identify the murderer of his assistant and countryman, who he 
suspects was killed mistakenly, the murderer having assumed that they were killing Frimbo for having 
used his psychic abilities to cheat a gambling operation. At the novel’s conclusion, Frimbo succeeds in 
drawing out the murderer, but at the cost of his own life. It turns out that Frimbo’s absolutely 
unsuspected affair with his landlord’s wife, never betrayed even by Archer’s retrospective narrative 
interventions, but perhaps by a framing musical reference to ‘I’ll Be Glad When You’re Dead, You 
Rascal You’, is the cause of what eventually becomes a double murder. In The Conjure Man Dies, 
nothing ever is quite what it seems. 
 
As the literary critic Adrienne Gosselin (1998) has noted, Fisher was so intent on playing with the 
formal rules of his chosen literary genre that, while the relationship between Archer and Dart might 
seem to parallel that between Sherlock Holmes and John Watson, especially when Archer emphasises 
contra Dart that detection rests on attention to detail and an intuitive grasp of its significance, it is in 
fact Frimbo who embodies the synthesis of Holmesian intuition and Watsonian scientific rationality. 
Consequently, Gosselin argues, by closing The Conjure Man Dies with Frimbo’s death, Fisher becomes 
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‘the perpetrator of one of the most dastardly crimes in popular fiction … the murder of Sherlock 
Holmes’ (608). Explaining why Fisher should have opted for this narrative course has generated much 
disagreement, most of it pivoting around the relationship between the question of ‘Africa’, on the one 
hand, and the African-American social and cultural predicament, on the other hand (see Soitos 1996; 
Gosselin 1999; and Condé 2002). In light of these disagreements, Frimbo’s death is perhaps best 
understood as a rejection of the synthesis of African and American cultures demanded by African-
American intellectuals such as W.E.B. DuBois, who famously spoke of ‘two souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it 
from being torn asunder’ (as quoted in Bell 1996: 94). More specifically, from the perspective of 
African-American modernist critics such as Fisher, the Duboisian programme for the construction of 
an autonomous African-American culture was predicated firstly on the sovereign subject of the 
bourgeois imagination. Holmes’ extraordinary capacities, for example, reassured the late Victorian 
reader of their autonomy in an increasingly alien world, which was dominated by the very scientific 
rationality that was in fact supposed to establish their cultural, social and political hegemony (see 
Knight 1980). Such sovereignty simply was inconceivable in a world where African-Americans would 
always be marked by race. In fact, in short stories such as High Yaller (1925), Fisher attends to the 
dynamics of ‘passing’, that is, to the dynamics of pretending to be white, noting thereby the ways in 
which African-Americans themselves reproduced racial differentiation within the confines of Harlem 
itself as a marker of social distinction. Furthermore, the adaptation of this bourgeois ideology in 
African-American context would entail the reification of a distinctive African culture and thus further 
complicity with American racism. It is worth recalling that one of the markers of Holmes’ sovereignty 
was his penchant for cocaine, despite the moral dubiety associated with the opium dens that Conan 
Doyle has Holmes visit, principally because Holmes was able to enjoy the freedom from bourgeois 
restraint that his habit is supposed to have allowed, without however becoming dependent on the 
habit, the marker of the Oriental opium smokers’ racial and moral inferiority (Harris 2003; see also 
Marez 1997 and Reitz 2004). Similarly, the celebration of a distinctively African culture pandered to 
the American, urban middle classes’ search for authenticity in Harlem, brilliantly reconstructed in 
David Levering Lewis’ When Harlem Was in Vogue (1979), without however ever having to engage 
with the often violent realities of modern, urban African-American life. Fisher’s rejection of this entire 
programme is neatly encapsulated by Du Bois’ criticism of Walls of Jericho (1928), Fisher’s semi-
fictional, ethnographic account of African-American life in Harlem, for its failure to provide any 
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representation of the Duboisian ‘talented tenth’ who would overcome the burdens of ‘double 
consciousness’ (see Soitos 1996: 100).  
 
Returning to The Conjure Man Dies, Fisher advances this rejection of the Duboisian programme by 
returning to Frimbo’s physiological experiments, which aree initially passed over without any 
comment. While these experiments were wholly orthodox in both their practice and intent (see 
Sengoopta 2003; Hirschbein, 2000), and would thus seem to speak to much more than just a 
peculiarly African-American predicament, Frimbo’s fuller articulation of such intent leads Archer to 
diagnose Frimbo as clinically paranoid. 3 More specifically, Frimbo’s ambition is to become one with 
the entire history of the people from whom he descended by manipulating his germinal constitution 
and thus achieve freedom from all historical subjection. Almost as if to evoke Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe’s concept of the urpflanze, Frimbo argues that, 
The germplasm … is the epitome of the past. He who can learn its use can be master of his past. And he who can 
master his past, that man is free (159).  
Goethe advanced a very similar idea with respect to the development from seed to adult plant, but he 
also acknowledged that this fuller conception of the plant, the urpflanze, was not sensually perceptible 
because the senses cannot capture the flow of time, only its sedimentation in specific historical 
configurations (Simms 2005; see also Caygill 1996). To Fisher, by way of Archer, Frimbo’s attempt to 
materialise and capture the flow of time is therefore a ‘delusional’ (159) ambition, be it that of a 
wealthy, exquisitely educated and perceptive African émigré who complains that he is everywhere 
reminded of his race, or that of an equally well educated physician who has to compete with the many 
unorthodox practitioners who populate Harlem. The impossibility of any mastery over one’s historical 
location is further reinforced by having Frimbo die in the very act of accidentally revealing the 
murderer’s identity. Even this, however, is insufficient to reveal the murderer’s motives, as is required 
by the formal rules of detective fiction. These motives are again disclosed accidentally, when the 
distraught landlord’s wife attacks her lover’s murderer, revealing him to be none other than the 
husband she betrayed. The world, in other words, is far from being ruled by the intelligible, 
deterministic laws to which Frimbo often refers in his philosophical conversations with Archer, every 
moment instead being open to manifold, irreversible permutations. Finally, Fisher displaces the 
anthropological attention that privileged the ‘spirituals’ as the authentic African-American voice, by 
having Archer cast doubts on Frimbo’s recollections of his native Africa, replacing it with jazz and the 
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voice it gives to the insurgent power of the African-American encounter with the modern city (see 
Simawe, 2001; also Baker, 1987 and Bhabha, 1994). Herein lies the importance of Brown, the street 
wise detective who discovers the assistant’s body, uses his contacts in the Harlemite underworld to 
uncover possible motives for wanting to kill the conjureman, and voices the closing lines of The 
Conjure Man Dies. In these closing lines, spoken as Brown and Jenkins walk away to the sound of the 
very same caustic song about betrayal and death, ‘I’ll Be Glad When You’re Dead, You Rascal You’, 
with which The Conjure Man Dies opens, Brown refuses to condemn the murderer:  
He jes’ didn’t mean to lose his wife and his life both. Couldn’t blame him for that. Jes’ ordinary common sense 
(186).  
With these lines, Fisher abandons the classical narrative model, which insists on moral closure, opting 
instead for the indeterminacy of Chester Himes’ later tales of crime in African-American Los Angeles.4 
Fisher thus begins to affirm the mutability and manifold possibilities of an inescapably fractured life. 
 
In sum, the question of history might be said to haunt The Conjure Man Dies, but it has very little to 
say on the matter of forensic detection, to which Carlo Ginzburg attaches so much importance. John 
Archer’s Nose, however, focuses exclusively on this topic. Here, the relationship between Archer and 
Dart would appear to be much closer to the Doylesian contrast between Holmes and Watson, as they 
confront the deadly consequences of the trade in healing potions, namely the death of an ailing child 
and another accidental murder, that of the healer’s son, Sonny, to avenge the former death. Strikingly, 
if Archer insists ultimately that ‘superstition killed Sonny’ (Fisher 1996a: 182), he once again refuses to 
condemn those who trade in ‘superstition’, even if it entails loss of income to himself and the death of 
others: it is all part of the fabric of life in Harlem, the place which Fisher sometimes dubbed the ‘city of 
refuge’ (see Fisher 1996c; see also Cacioppo 2003). What is more important, however, is that, whereas 
Dart’s rational reconstruction of the murder and ‘hard ball’ inquisitorial techniques fail, Archer 
identifies the culprit and their motives by using his olfactory sense. Fisher, who, as an aspiring 
radiation biologist, could not but be aware of the mediated nature of the senses, uses this as a device to 
note their different historical development: 
‘Odors should be restricted’, he pursued. ‘They should be captured, classified, and numbered like the lines of the 
spectrum. We let them run wild …’ 
‘Check’. 
‘And sacrifice a wealth of information. In a language of a quarter of a million words, we havn’t a single specific 
direct denotation of a smell’. 
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‘Oh, no?’ 
‘No. Whatever you’re thinking of, it is an indirect and non-specific denotation, linking the odor in mind to 
something else. We are content with ‘fragrant’ and ‘foul’ or general terms of that character, or at best ‘alcoholic’ 
or ‘mouldy’, which are obviously indirect. We haven’t even such general direct terms as apply to colors – red, 
green, and blue. We name what we see but not what we smell’ 
‘Which is just as well’. 
‘On the contrary. If we could designate each smell by number …’ 
‘We’d know right off who killed Sonny’. 
‘Perhaps. I dare say every crime has its peculiar odor’. 
‘Old stuff. They used bloodhounds in Uncle Tom’s Cabin’. 
‘We could use one here’ (157; emphasis added).  
Before relating Fisher’s critical interventions with respect to primitivism to Ginzburg’s very different 
history of the senses, it is important to bear in mind that Fisher’s contextual detail is formally 
necessary for the functioning of the detective novel, so that one cannot separate Fisher’s contribution 
to the genre and his reflections on the politics of history and knowledge. 
 
Ginzburg in Harlem 
When writing about the invention of the modern anthropological project, the attempt to construct a 
science of ‘Man’, the very project which Carlo Ginzburg would rescue from historiographical 
relativism, Michel Foucault (1994b: 326) observed that the enterprise would always discover an 
obdurate obscurity at the heart of every schema of understanding it might develop. As he put it: 
Man and the unthought are … contemporaries. Man has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in 
an episteme without thought at the same time discovering, both in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also 
in its very warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert density in which it is embedded. 
The issue has long been what meaning to assign to this ‘element of darkness’, and Ginzburg’s answer is 
less than satisfactory.  
 
Firstly, Ginzburg (1990) overlooks the ways in which generalising and particularising forms of 
knowledge are equally dependent on the training of the senses. Galileo Galilei may indeed have 
restricted the legitimate sources of knowledge to ‘figures, numbers and movements, but not smell, nor 
tastes, nor sounds’ (108), but Ginzburg also passes too lightly over Galileo’s reference to the need for 
‘eyes on the forehead and the brain’ (207n73). Were Ginzburg to take this statement about the 
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dependence of scientific reason on an appropriately trained visual sense seriously, he would have to 
abandon his opposition between the singular and sensual, on the one hand, and the rational and 
universal, on the other hand. Secondly, if Alain Corbin (1986) has brilliantly illustrated the ways in 
which the olfactory sense is just as historically produced, it is Marcel Proust (1982: 48-51), the 
conservative critic of modernity, who famously transforms this same sense into the supreme vehicle of 
authentic recollection (see also Sprinker 1988). Such forgetfulness about the history of the senses 
comes at a cost, insofar as the specific ways in which the senses are organised are pregnant with 
political consequences: as Richard Dyer (1997) has noted, the politics of race are inseparable from a 
culture of visualisation in which to be white is to be not coloured. If Ginzburg will insist that there is 
something about sensual knowledge that transcends history and this is the key to historical truth, 
someone will have to bear the burden of representing such immemorial knowledge, for nothing can be 
known in itself and for itself. It is Rudolph Fisher rather than Arthur Conan Doyle, the spokesman of 
race and empire, who reminds the reader about the politics involved in the reification of the form of 
knowing which supposedly ‘binds the human animal closely to other animal species’. This has been the 
great burden of that creature which Henry Louis Gates (1988) has named the ‘signifyin(g) monkey’, 
and the price to be paid for the renewal of wholeness and order, the renewal of historical plenitude 
that Ginzburg, the historian, would promise.  
 
This said, it is all too often overlooked, even by those attentive to the links between Ginzburg’ critical 
interventions and the crisis of Marxist cultural theory, that Ginzburg also is the champion of the 
Benjaminian call to ‘brush history against the grain’, to undo all the work of erasure and thus recapture 
the truth of history in its totality (as quoted in Ginzburg 1999: 248; see also Gordon 2001). 
Significantly, this much quoted Benjaminian phrase is taken from the very same essay from which 
Ginzburg borrows the phrase ‘nothing that has taken place should be lost to history … But only to 
redeemed humanity does the past belong in its entirety’ (Benjamin 1973: 246). From this Benjaminian 
perspective, in Menocchio’s moment of silence before the Inquisition, which Ginzburg famously tries 
to grasp in The Cheese and the Worms, or, returning to Ginzburg’s formative reading of Leo Tolstoy’s 
War and Peace, in the moment in which Prince André and Pierre engage in battle at Austerlitz and 
Borodino, the singular and the totality of human experience come together (Ginzburg, 1994: 23-24). 
Moreover, if Ginzburg (1999: 98) also draws a parallel between such moments and Sergei Eisenstein’s 
modernist cinematic aesthetic, in which the cut or interruption is supposed to offer far more than 
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meets the eye, what is at stake is the evocation of the revolutionary ‘event’ when everything is once 
again possible.5 To then focus, as most of the discussions of Ginzburg’s interventions have done (see 
Peltonen 2001), on the analytical difficulties they involve in connecting the singular and specific, on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, ‘the past in its entirety’, is to mistake questions of method and 
ontology, and onto-theological questions to be more precise. On the other hand, if the Parisian 
revolutionaries of 1830 sought to stop time by destroying the clock-towers, they, like Benjamin (1973a: 
253) who brings them to memory in the very same essay to which Ginzburg refers his readers, in his 
introduction to The Cheese and the Worms, knew that they could not, that they too would be 
integrated into the linear, continuous time of the modern historical imagination. Ginzburg (1994: 27) 
is no stranger to these considerations about the nature of historical time insofar as, when discussing 
the fraught relationship between historical ‘events’ and ‘structures’, he speaks of ‘reality’ as 
‘fundamentally discontinuous and heterogeneous’.  If reality is so discontinuous and heterogeneous, 
however, the historical horizon of redemption to which Ginzburg also recalls his readers is 
unintelligible. At this point, the literary and historiographical imagination, which Ginzburg insists on 
keeping apart, despite his increasing drift toward an understanding of historiography as a narrative 
exercise, merge into one as they both desperately seek to ‘stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what 
has been smashed’ (Benjamin 1973a: 249). Of course, as Benjamin also noted, this is work for the 
Messiah. The fuller statement of the Benjaminian passage, which Ginzburg cites only partially in the 
final lines of his introduction to The Cheese and the Worms, is: 
A chronicler who recites events without distinguishing between major and minor ones acts in accordance with 
the following truth: nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost to history. To be sure, only a 
redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past – which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past 
become citable in all its moments. Each moment it has lived becomes a citation à l’ordre du jour – and that day 
is Judgment Day (Benjamin 1973a: 246). 
That Ginzburg cannot speak in such messianic terms is proof of the extraordinary hold of the scientific 
imagination, despite Ginzburg’s attempts to free historiographical practice from it, so that there is still 
something to learn from Fisher’s reflections on our irredeemably fractured lives, about their dangers 
and all their possibilities.6 
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Notes 
 
1 For an introduction to Benjamin and his philosophy of history, as well as to its relevance to the contemporary problem that 
Ginzburg seeks to address, see Fritsch (2005); also Osborne (1995). 
2 In this essay, the term ‘post-structuralism’ identifies those such as Foucault, who, like structuralists such as Claude Levi-
Strauss, maintain that the relationship between sign and referent is secured by the cross-reference of signs, but, unlike 
structuralists, maintain that the rules of cross-reference are historically variable; although they share common origins, post-
structuralists’ understanding of language is therefore fundamentally different to the critique of reference advanced by 
deconstructionists such as Jacques Derrida; see McDonald (2004)). Ginzburg’s concern about post-structuralism, 
deconstruction and their implications for historiographical practice are already evident in his introduction to the original, Italian 
version of The Cheese and the Worms, but see also Ginzburg (1994; 1999). While the implicit historical relativism of post-
structuralism clearly is an anathema to Ginzburg, Ginzburg’s relationship to Levi-Strauss is more ambiguous, insofar as Levi-
Strauss reasserts the fundamental importance of semiotics, but within the very kind of totalising, scientific framework that 
Ginzburg criticises; see Ginzburg (1979: 273). 
3 Records in the Rudolph Fisher Collection, held in the John Hay Library at Brown University, suggest that, early in his career, 
Fisher wrote a short story about a radiologist, The Emancipation of Science (1919), in which he explored the relationship 
between science, democracy and Duboisian ‘uplift’, but this short story remained unpublished and the manuscript is now 
possibly lost. Fisher’s increasing scepticism about the emancipating connotations of scientific rationality is evident in the 
progression from The Emancipation of Science, through The South Lingers On (1925 )  to The Conjure Man Dies (1932) and Dr. 
Archer’s Nose (1935). 
4 On Himes, see Soitos, (1996: 125-178) and Rabinowitz (1988). Significantly, for all her disagreements with Soitos’ reading of 
The Conjure Man Dies, Gosselin (1999) is equally committed to grounding a distinctive and autonomous African-American 
culture in some aspect or another of a primitive and original African culture, by suggesting that, whereas Oedipus’ search for the 
truth, an ultimately tragic search, structures the classical detective genre, the African-American hardboiled genre is structured 
by the story of the Egyptian god Osiris, so that the narrative is less focussed on the search for the murderer than on the collective 
search for the redemption of the victim; see also Lock (1994). While some aspects of The Conjure Man Dies do fit, there are too 
many aspects that are better understood as expressing deep reservations about the celebrations of all things African; see also 
Condé (2002). 
5 Benjamin is of course famous for his discussion of the revolutionary potential of the cinematic medium, especially in the hands 
of directors such as Eisenstein; see Benjamin (1973b). Although Ginzburg (1994: 26) does not draw this connection directly, he 
does so through the work of Siegfried Kracauer, historian and film critic. 
6 From this perspective, Ginzburg’s insistence that the oral form is more attuned to the realities of the phenomenal world than is 
the written form recalls Martin Heidegger’s reflections on the relationship between poetry and prose, in which the loss of the 
former was symptomatic of all that is problematic about modern culture; see Heidegger (1975). While Ginzburg seeks to 
overcome the rupture in the relationship between language and the world, of which the opposition between prose and poetry is a 
symptom, by returning to an Aristotelian understanding of rhetoric, he fails to address the ontological problem at issue, one with 
which language has been saddled since the Nietzschean ‘death of God’. 
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